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Abstract
Several climate ethicists have recently argued that having children is morally equiva-
lent to over-consumption, and contributes greatly to parents’ personal carbon foot-
prints. We show that these claims are mistaken, for two reasons. First, including 
procreation in parents’ carbon footprints double-counts children’s consumption 
emissions, once towards their own, and once towards their parents’ footprints. We 
show that such double-counting defeats the chief purpose of the concept of carbon 
footprint, namely to measure the sustainability and equitability of one’s activities 
and choices. Furthermore, we show that proposals to avoid double-counting have 
other unacceptable implications. Second, we show that the key arguments for a sup-
posed moral equivalence of procreation and consumption overgenerate and lead to 
unacceptable consequences in many cases, such as for the work of doctors who save 
lives or enable procreation. Finally, we propose that rather than counting children’s 
emissions towards their parents’ carbon footprints, we should consider these emis-
sions as part of the parents’ carbon impact, i.e. the difference that their choices make 
to the overall global carbon emissions. It is from the perspective of impact that we 
should think about the ethics of procreation in an age of climate change.
Keywords Climate change · Carbon footprint · Procreation · Responsibility
What should you, as an individual, do to prevent catastrophic climate change? You 
could fly less, go vegan, or turn down the thermostat in your home. Your choices 
about these matters all make a significant difference to your personal carbon foot-
print. Yet, one choice seems to undo or outdo them all: Whether to have a(nother) 
child. After all, your child will cause immense emissions by eating, heating, 
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travelling, etc. over her lifetime. Moreover, she might have children herself who will 
cause yet more emissions.
This line of thought has been popularized in newspaper pieces which have stated 
“Want to fight climate change? Have fewer children” (Carrington 2017), have won-
dered “Should We Be Having Kids In The Age Of Climate Change?” (Ludden 2016; 
Murtaugh 2015), and have even asked whether parents “are the worst climate sin-
ners” (Kramper 2017) and whether “procreation is pollution” (Christinaz 2018). It 
has made an ongoing impact in climate change activism and advocacy as well, e.g. 
in movements such as the “BirthStrike” campaign group (see Elks 2019)1 or on-line 
recommendations for cutting your personal carbon footprint (e.g. Chandler 2019).
These provocative claims and questions are inspired and backed by a number of 
recent philosophical discussions of the climate ethical implications of procreation, 
which in turn draw on statistical analysis of how various activities and lifestyles 
impact the climate. Based on these calculations, several philosophers and statisti-
cians have argued that if we want to fight climate change, then we should shift our 
focus from consumption to the yet undertheorized area of procreation.2 More spe-
cifically, they argue that having children is morally equivalent to morally problem-
atic extensive consumption, and contributes immensely to parents’ personal carbon 
footprints.
These claims, alongside some of their central presuppositions and implications, 
have not yet received the critical scrutiny they deserve. In this paper, we argue firstly 
that procreation should not be counted towards parents’ carbon footprint. Secondly, 
if procreation is morally problematic from a climate ethics perspective, the reason 
for this cannot be a supposed analogy to consumption. Thirdly, those arguing for 
an obligation to limit individual procreation in response to climate change should 
re-frame their positions in terms of a new concept, carbon impact, rather than car-
bon footprint. In sum, we think that the dangers of climate change may well provide 
moral grounds for limiting procreation, but these grounds cannot be cashed out in 
terms of carbon footprint or a supposed analogy between procreation and consump-
tion. Exploring alternative grounds is beyond the scope of this paper, but we provide 
the concept of carbon impact as a starting point for a conceptually more precise cli-
mate ethics of procreation.
Our proposal to reframe the debate has also a significant practical upshot, for 
the claim that procreation contributes enormously to parents’ footprints creates a 
dilemma: On one horn of the dilemma, each person’s permissible footprint is too 
small to accommodate the footprint increase that comes with having even just a 
1 The idea that we should have fewer children to combat climate change is often conflated with the dif-
ferent idea that due to the negative impact climate change will have on the quality of life of future gen-
erations, it may be better not to have children for their own sake. This latter idea was recently given 
additional prominence by U.S. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, but the public reaction to her 
quickly attributed to her the former idea (see Green 2019). A Fox News opinion piece was quick to asso-
ciate her idea with coercive population control (see Ma 2019).
2 The seminal paper that quantifies the climate significance of procreation is Murtaugh and Schlax 
(2009). Their calculations are largely taken for granted by Conly (2016: 16), Earl et al. (2017), Hedberg 
(2019), Hickey et al. (2016), MacIver (2015), and Rieder (2016).
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single child per couple. It then follows that having even just one child per couple 
is morally wrong. This seems overly harsh—maybe we have strong reason to have 
fewer children, but, arguably, it should still be permissible to have at least one child 
per couple.
On the other horn of the dilemma having some number of children (for instance, 
one child per couple) is morally permissible. But then it seems that everyone is mor-
ally permitted to have an extremely large carbon footprint, namely so large as to 
include all the emissions that morally permissible procreation would produce. Then 
it follows that people without children are permitted extremely high consumption 
emissions that we would normally consider morally wrong. What started out as a 
philosophical project aimed at reducing emissions then turns into a permission for 
childless people to have unsustainably high footprints.3
The upshot of our paper, that the climate significance of procreation should not 
be understood in analogy to consumption, helps us avoid this dilemma, as procrea-
tion and consumption cannot simply be weighed against each other. It is then pos-
sible to hold that irrespective of our procreative choices, we are morally required to 
lower our consumption emissions as much as possible.
In Sect. 1, we show how a number of climate ethicists have recently conceptual-
ized the ethical significance of procreation in terms of personal carbon footprint, 
have modelled procreative choices on consumption choices, or assume that procrea-
tion and consumption are morally comparable along the same metrics. In Sects. 2 
and 3, we show how including emissions that result from procreation in parents’ 
carbon footprints leads to objectionable double-counting of emissions. This double-
counting, we argue, can only be avoided by compromising the overall ethical point 
that the above ethicists want to make. In Sect. 4, we show how arguments on behalf 
of treating procreation as akin to footprint-increasing consumption overgenerate and 
lead to implausible implications. In Sect. 5, we diagnose the underlying problems 
with the idea that procreation and consumption are on a par, and indicate how we 
should instead think of the ethical significance of procreation for climate ethics. In 
Sect. 6, we explain in more detail how our position enables us to avoid the above 
dilemma, and how we can maintain that some procreation is permissible, but exten-
sive consumption is not.
Four preliminary notes are in order here: First, the existing academic literature 
partly focuses on individual ethics and partly on the ethics of “population engi-
neering”4, i.e. society-wide interventions to reduce the fertility rate and thereby a 
3 In principle, such problematic trade-offs are not unique to procreation. If we hold that some kind of 
consumption, e.g. an average diet, is permissible, then we have to grant people a sufficiently large foot-
print allowance. If someone then opts for a lower footprint diet, they can use the footprint savings on 
other consumption, e.g. holiday flights. But procreation creates a particularly problematic trade-off, for 
two reasons: First, the premise that having at least one child is permissible is much harder to deny than 
the premise that some typical consumption choice, e.g. an average non-vegan diet, is permissible. Sec-
ond, given the commonly assumed large footprint of having children, the extent of the trade-off is much 
larger than with trade-offs between ordinary consumption items.
4 This term was coined by Hickey et al. (2016), who propose a number of relatively non-coercive politi-
cal means to reduce population growth.
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society’s carbon footprint. In the present discussion, we focus on individual ethics. 
Second, we restrict our discussion to persons whose carbon emissions are relatively 
high in global terms, such as most people in affluent Western countries, and well-off 
people in developing and emerging economies. Third, we only consider people who 
are free to make their own procreative choices. Fourth, by “carbon emissions” we 
mean all greenhouse gas emissions, expressed in  CO2 equivalents.
1  Having children and carbon emissions
When a high-carbon-emitter has a child, we can expect this child to follow similar 
high-emission consumption patterns as their parent. We can expect them to eat meat, 
drive cars, and use air travel to go on vacation. Furthermore, they may themselves 
have children, who in turn can be expected to engage in all of these activities. Had 
the high-carbon-emitter not had a child, then they would have prevented all of these 
future emissions.5 The choice of whether to have an (additional)6 child then makes a 
much larger difference than any typical consumption choice.7
To illustrate this point, suppose an 18-year-old commits to never owning a car 
and to cycling to work or taking public transportation instead. This choice may seem 
highly effective. But if she commits to having one child less than she would oth-
erwise have, then this choice has a much larger impact: It prevents all of the emis-
sions that the possible child would generate through their driving behaviour, plus all 
of their other emissions, plus all of the emissions of their children and subsequent 
descendants.
Recently, several authors have argued that, since procreative choices are of such 
significance for the climate, procreation immensely increases parents’ carbon foot-
prints, and is, in climate-ethical terms, equivalent to extensive consumption. For 
example, Young (2001: 183) argues that
it is inconsistent to believe that overconsumption is wrong or bad yet believe 
that having children is morally permissible, insofar as they produce compa-
rable environmental impacts, are voluntary choices, and arise from similar 
desires.
In a more recent contribution, MacIver (2015: 107) writes
5 We assume that the decrease in emissions caused by people not having children would not be offset by 
increased consumption or procreation of others. Of course, there can be exceptional cases in which this 
assumption does not hold.
6 We leave the qualification “additional” henceforth implicit. Except when we discuss specifically the 
absolute number of children a person has, we are always concerned with the effect of having one more 
child.
7 Wynes et al. (2017: 6) provide an influential comparison of popular recommendations for individual 
emissions reductions with the measures that are in fact most effective, the list of which is topped by 
“having one fewer child.”
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the standard dichotomy between “procreation” and “consumption” should be 
collapsed. […] the impacts associated with procreation should be understood 
as part of the “ecological footprint” of parents[.]
and goes on to argue (MacIver 2015: 115) that procreation
can singlehandedly cancel out other efforts at mitigating environmental 
impacts.
Whilst in Young’s and MacIver’s work, these claims are given central importance 
and detailed defence, these claims are also endorsed elsewhere in the literature. In 
a yet more recent contribution to the debate, Travis Rieder argues for ethical limits 
to procreation based on a number of different rationales, such as agent-neutral rea-
sons and justice (Rieder 2016: 26–32, 59–62), agent-specific reasons for not hav-
ing children for their own sake (ibid.36), and green virtues (ibid. 57–9). Whilst his 
main arguments do not hinge on an analogy or moral equivalence between procrea-
tion and consumption, he nonetheless treats procreation and consumption as morally 
comparable along the same metric of carbon footprint:
having a child may make one responsible for as much as 9441 metric tons of 
 CO2, while a flight from Washington, DC to Paris increases one’s carbon foot-
print by approximately 1 metric ton (Rieder 2016: 40)
Rieder here summarizes the findings of Murtaugh and Schlax (2009: 18), who 
calculate the “carbon legacy” of procreative choices. They use these calculations to 
directly compare modifications of one’s consumption behaviour, such as changing 
light bulbs, to the choice about having a child, and find the latter to massively over-
shadow the former. The same findings are also the foundation of Hedberg (2019: 6) 
claim that
procreation makes by far the largest contribution to one’s individual GHG 
[greenhouse gas] emissions[.]8
Whilst all of the above authors endorse what we below label the “Footprint The-
sis”, the significance of this thesis differs for their respective arguments. Conse-
quently, the implications and seriousness of our criticism of the Footprint Thesis 
also differs between these authors, and different authors will have different resources 
to respond to our proposed shift to the concept of carbon impact. We return to these 
differences when we present our alternative theoretical framework. For the time 
being, we take all of the above authors to endorse the
8 Note that this is distinct from Hedberg (2018) earlier argument which appeals to a requirement to live 
with integrity. There, he assumes a duty to support a political collective solution to climate change, and 
argues that such a duty implies an individual duty to reduce one’s personal greenhouse gas emissions.
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Footprint Thesis: A person’s carbon footprint includes some or all of the con-
sumption emissions of her children and subsequent descendants.9
2  The Double‑Counting Problem
If we specify the phrase “some or all” in the Footprint Thesis, we can obtain dif-
ferent specifications of the thesis, which differ in what kind and how many of a 
descendant’s emissions count towards her ancestors’ footprints. Our first argument 
against the Footprint Thesis shows that any specification of the Footprint Thesis 
leads to objectionable double-counting of emissions. In Sect. 3, we will show that 
once we amend the Footprint Thesis to avoid double-counting, new, hitherto unrec-
ognized, problems emerge for different specifications of the amended thesis.
2.1  How Double‑Counting Arises
To see how the Footprint Thesis leads to double-counting of emissions, consider a 
stylised example of a very small world with only one couple and one child:
Small World: Abel and Berenice choose to have a child, Chantelle. Abel and 
Berenice each have lifetime emissions of 1000 t of  CO2 which arise from their 
consumption behaviour, and Chantelle’s consumption behaviour likewise will 
cause 1000 t of carbon emissions. Chantelle may herself have children in turn, 
but these children and subsequent descendants would live in a carbon-neutral 
future and not cause any net emissions.
Abel and Berenice’s footprints contain their own consumption emissions, and, 
according to the Footprint Thesis, also some or all of Chantelle’s consumption 
emissions. Let us assume, following Murtaugh and Schlax (2009), that all of her 
emissions count towards her parents’ footprints, divided evenly between them.10 So 
Abel’s lifetime carbon footprint is 1000 t + 500 t = 1500 t, and likewise for Beren-
ice. Since the authors who endorse the Footprint Thesis do not explicitly discuss 
descendants’ footprints, we read the Footprint Thesis as implicitly holding that 
Chantelle’s consumption emissions also remain included in her own footprint, as 
the default position is that a person’s consumption emissions count towards her own 
footprint. Chantelle’s footprint then consists in the 1000 t of consumption emissions 
over her lifetime.
9 While Young (2001) does not explicitly use the term “carbon footprint”, he treats procreation as analo-
gous to consumption. As consumption is the paradigmatic contributor to people’s carbon footprints, it is 
fair to frame Young’s view in terms of the Footprint Thesis. Moreover, our objection to Young’s analogy 
in Sect. 4 can be framed without the use of the term “carbon footprint”, by instead only talking about 
moral responsibility for using up resources.
10 Different splits between parents are conceivable. For example, in a patriarchal society in which men 
make all major family decisions, the male parents’ share may be much larger. Our arguments hold irre-
spective of the specifics of the split.
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The Footprint Thesis leads to double-counting of Chantelle’s emissions because, 
as Fig. 1 illustrates, the very same emissions that arise from Chantelle’s consump-
tion count once towards Chantelle’s footprint, and once towards Abel’s and Beren-
ice’s footprints.
Note that double-counting also happens if only some of Chantelle’s emissions, for 
example, only her emissions before coming of age, also count towards her parents’ 
footprints. It is then these emissions that are counted twice. The following discus-
sion thus applies to all specifications of the Footprint Thesis—the only thing that 
changes are the specific amounts of double-counted emissions.11
Except for two brief mentions of double-counting (van Basshuysen 2018a, b), 
neither authors who endorse nor those who criticise the Footprint Thesis have hith-
erto appreciated that the thesis implies double-counting. But, as we show in the fol-
lowing, such double-counting is highly problematic for the Footprint Thesis.
2.2  Why Double‑Counting is Problematic
That double counting of emissions is to be avoided is usually taken for granted with-
out further discussion. For instance, Broome (2016: 163) contends that “[…] we 
must recognize one constraint […] The total of emissions attributed to each person 
should be equal to the total actually emitted”, which is incompatible with double-
counting (see below). Likewise, the 2015 Paris agreement explicitly requires that the 
agreement’s parties avoid double-counting with regard to both emissions and emis-
sion-reduction.12Note that double-counting is only problematic between footprint-
bearers of the same type, e.g. states, corporations, or individuals. Double counting 
between different types of footprint-bearers is not our concern here. For example, 
the fact that the footprint of a state includes emissions that also count towards the 
footprint of its citizens need not be a problem. But, apart from a brief discussion 
(van Basshuysen 2018b), it remains unclear why exactly double-counting is to be 
avoided.
The main problem with double-counting, we contend, is its incompatibility with 
the standard concept of carbon footprint as it is employed in current discussions 
concerning climate ethics and climate change mitigation. While there has been con-
siderable debate about exactly which emissions count towards an individual’s car-
bon footprint,13 the literature about carbon footprint and procreation, and, more gen-
erally, individual climate ethics, agrees that a person’s carbon footprint measures 
how much  CO2 and other greenhouse gases her activities add to the atmosphere. The 
reason we are especially interested in these emissions in the first place (and not e.g. 
11 See Sect. 3 for a detailed discussion.
12 Paris Agreement, article 4, paragraph 13 (United Nations 2015): “In accounting for anthropogenic 
emissions and removals corresponding to their nationally determined contributions, Parties shall pro-
mote environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability and consistency, and 
ensure the avoidance of double counting.”
13 For a survey of the wide variety of uses of the notion of a carbon footprint see Wiedmann and Minx 
(2008). See also Wright et al. (2011).
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in the amount of water vapour a person exhales) is that the atmosphere’s capacity to 
safely absorb carbon emissions is limited and currently over-used. Carbon footprint 
thus measures how much of this limited absorption capacity of the atmosphere a 
person is using up.14
Additionally, the concept of carbon footprint also serves two practical functions: 
evaluation and guidance. First, we can evaluate the entirety of a person’s carbon 
footprint with regard to its sustainability and equity: How does the amount of emis-
sions associated with the person’s activities compare to the maximum per capita 
emissions that are consistent with a sufficiently ambitious emissions reduction path 
for humanity as a whole? This question is answered e.g. by some carbon footprint 
calculators, which contextualise and interpret the absolute amount of emissions by 
making claims such as “If everyone lived like you, we would need four planets.”
Second, a breakdown of a person’s carbon footprint by activities offers her spe-
cific guidance about how she can reduce her carbon footprint. For example, such a 



















Fig. 1  Double-counting
14 The metaphor of “footprint” itself also implies a reference to a limited resource. The concept of car-
bon footprint is derived from the more inclusive notion of ecological footprint (Wright et al. 2011: 61), 
which is measured in the productive land area needed to sustain a particular activity. This measure is 
directly related to an overall resource limit, since the overall productive land area on Earth is limited.
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Implicit in the measurement, evaluation, and guidance functions is the idea that 
a person is morally responsible for her carbon footprint: She is answerable for her 
resource usage, and may be morally required to reduce it.
Authors who endorse the Footprint Thesis are most plausibly interpreted as 
using the standard concept of carbon footprint. After all, they do not say anything 
to the contrary or introduce a new and stipulative meaning of the term “carbon foot-
print”. Furthermore, they evaluate the emissions associated with procreative choices 
against the backdrop of massive over-use of the atmospheric absorption capacity, 
which is exactly the framework in which the standard concept of footprint functions. 
Finally, those authors who treat procreation and consumption as analogous because 
both supposedly use up, “appropriate” or “claim” limited resources (see for instance 
MacIver 2015: 113–115) explicitly use the standard concept of footprint, as they are 
concerned with using up or appropriation of finite resources as their paradigm for 
behaviour that affects the climate.
Unfortunately for authors who endorse the Footprint Thesis, though, the double-
counting of emissions implied by the thesis is at odds with the very same measure-
ment and evaluation functions of the standard concept of carbon footprint that is at 
the heart of the thesis.
First, due to double-counting, Chantelle’s consumption emissions count both 
towards her parents’ carbon footprints and towards her own footprint. This implies 
that her parents’ procreative choices use up a certain part of the atmosphere’s 
absorption capacity, and that Chantelle’s consumption uses up the same part again. 
But the same part of a resource can’t be used up twice. Hence the double-counting 
implied by the Footprint Thesis is inconsistent with the function of carbon footprint 
as a measure of how much of a limited resource we use up.
This conflict with the measurement function of carbon footprint also means 
that, contrary to the constraint that the “total of emissions attributed to each person 
should be equal to the total actually emitted” (Broome 2016: 163), the sum-total of 
the footprints of a society’s members does not measure how much the society uses 
up: Assume that in Small World, the atmosphere’s remaining absorption capacity is 
3000 t. Abel’s, Berenice’s, and Chantelle’s consumption each cause 1000 t of emis-
sions, and there are no other emitters. According to the assumed specification of the 
Footprint Thesis, Abel and Berenice each have a footprint of 1500 t, which double-
counts 2 × 500 t of emissions that are also included in Chantelle’s footprint. When 
we now add up all carbon footprints, we end up with a societal carbon footprint of 
2 × 1500 t + 1000 t = 4000 t, which would imply that the three agents together use up 
4000 t of the Earth’s absorption capacity and hence over-use. But they don’t—they 
only use up 3000 t. Furthermore, we also end up with the absurd implication that the 
addition of Chantelle, a person who consumes just as much as Abel and Berenice, 
increases the per capita emissions in their society, namely from 1000 t to 1333 t.15
15 (1500 t (Abel) + 1500 t (Berenice) + 1000 t (Chantelle))/3 = 1333 t. Note that Wynes et al. (2017) 
actually draw on this implausible implication, when they list having one fewer child alongside consump-
tion reductions as means to reduce per capita footprints.
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Second, double-counting is at odds with the evaluative function of the con-
cept of carbon footprint. To see this problem, let us evaluate Berenice’s and 
Abel’s footprints. In their society, their equal share in sustainable societal emis-
sions is 3000 t/3 = 1000 t. Their footprints, according to the assumed specifica-
tion of the Footprint Thesis, are 1500 t each, so it appears that they individually 
over-use the atmosphere in an unsustainable manner. This individual over-use 
is not offset by any under-use on the part of Chantelle, as she uses exactly her 
equal share. However, if some agents exceed, and none under-use their equal 
share, it follows that the three agents collectively over-use the atmosphere. But 
by stipulation, they don’t. Hence by modus tollens, the evaluation of Abel’s and 
Berenice’s behaviour as unsustainable is mistaken. This mistake arises because 
of double-counting, which is hence incompatible with the evaluation function of 
the standard concept of carbon footprint.
Since those accepting the Footprint Thesis typically rely on the measurement, 
evaluation, and guidance functions of the standard concept of carbon footprint, 
they cannot simply adopt a revisionary concept of carbon footprint that allows 
for double-counting. They thus would need to modify the thesis to avoid double-
counting. But, as we show in the next section, modifications geared towards pre-
serving the measuring and evaluation functions compromise the guidance func-
tion of carbon footprint and introduce additional problems.
3  The Splitting Problem
To preserve the measurement and evaluation functions of the concept of carbon 
footprint, each unit of emissions must only be included in one person’s footprint. 
Any unit of emissions of a person some generations down the family tree, say 
in generation G3, that we count towards the footprints of any of their present-
day ancestors in generation G1 must thus not also be counted towards (a) that 
future person’s footprint, or (b) the footprints of their intermediate ancestors in 
generation G2. A suitably amended version of the Footprint Thesis which avoids 
double-counting then reads:
Footprint Thesis*: A person’s carbon footprint includes some or all of the 
consumption emissions of her children and subsequent descendants, and 
these emissions are excluded from the carbon footprints of the children and 
subsequent descendants.
This amended Footprint Thesis* avoids the double-counting problem, but the 
required splitting of emissions between people’s footprints presents a new prob-
lem, the “splitting problem”: No split of emissions gives us results for the foot-
prints of descendants, present-day ancestors, and intermediate ancestors that are 
at least roughly in line with our intuitions about responsibility for carbon emis-
sions and that also accord overwhelming importance to procreative decisions.
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3.1  Maximum Footprint Thesis: Not Even Luxury Emissions Matter to Children’s 
Own Carbon Footprint
Consider again Murtaugh and Schlax’s calculations, which provide the largest and 
most influential estimates for the footprint of having children. Their calculations 
assume that all of a future descendant’s consumption emissions are to be counted 
towards the carbon footprints of all of her present-day ancestors, divided equally 
between them.16 To avoid double-counting, advocates of this position must further 
hold that none of these emissions are counted towards the carbon footprint of the 
descendant herself. Hence according to this “Maximum Footprint Thesis*”, no mat-
ter how much the descendant consumes, her own footprint remains zero.
This implication is absurd, and it is completely at odds with the evaluation and 
guidance functions of the concept of carbon footprint. To see this point, consider 
again the two-generation case of Chantelle and her parents, but now placing them in 
the real world with its over-emission of  CO2. Now assume that Chantelle engages in 
some conspicuous consumption that leads to clearly problematic luxury emissions, 
such as regular long-distance holiday flights. According to the Maximum Footprint 
Thesis*, the emissions associated with this behaviour feature in Abel’s and Beren-
ice’s footprints, but do not appear in Chantelle’s footprint at all. On this picture, 
while Abel’s and Berenice’s footprints maximally reflect the ethical significance of 
their procreative choices, Chantelle’s footprint does not reflect the significance of 
her consumption choices at all. It thus cannot be the basis for evaluating her prob-
lematic behaviour, and cannot be used to guide her towards ways to reduce emis-
sions, namely by reducing her luxury emissions.17
3.2  More Moderate Splits: Hardship and Subsistence Emissions Remain Invisible
Anyone who accepts the Footprint Thesis clearly would reject this absurd impli-
cation of the Maximum Footprint Thesis*. And indeed, some advocates of the 
Footprint Thesis explicitly propose to instead count only part of a child’s emis-
sions towards her parents’ footprints. However, these proposals are still beset with 
problems.
Consider one of MacIver’s (2015: 116) moderate proposals, namely that only 
hardship and subsistence emissions get handed down from descendants to ances-
tors. Hardship emissions are emissions that an agent can avoid, but avoiding them 
16 Splitting between present-day ancestors is necessary in order to avoid double-counting within this 
generation, which would occur if each ancestor received 100% of the descendant’s consumption emis-
sions. Murtaugh and Schlax do advocate such a split, but they are not aware of the problem of dou-
ble-counting between different generations. Note that Young’s argument for the Footprint Thesis, which 
relies on the foreseeable consequences of procreation, might support a more radical and even more 
problematic “split” in which 100% of descendants’ emissions get counted towards each parent. This is 
because up to a certain point each parent (usually) could have unilaterally decided against bringing a new 
person into existence.
17 van Basshuysen (2018b) similarly observe that it is implausible to attribute the emissions of optional 
consumption decisions of grown-up children to their ancestors rather than themselves.
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is very difficult and would lead to hardship for the agent. Subsistence emissions 
are impossible for an agent to avoid if she is to live a minimally decent life. Since 
both types of emissions are hard or impossible for the descendant to avoid, so the 
argument goes, it makes sense to attribute these emissions to the parents. After 
all, by not procreating, they could have readily averted the situation in which their 
descendant can hardly avoid causing these emissions.
However, the implications of excluding these emissions from the descendant’s 
footprint are highly problematic. Consider first hardship emissions: Suppose that 
it is possible, but financially very difficult, for Chantelle to improve the insulation 
of her home. Due to the associated hardship, she may not be required to make this 
sacrifice. But her footprint should still show her that this supererogatory sacrifice 
is a way for her to reduce her emissions, and that she thus has some reason to 
make the sacrifice. Hence, if we exclude hardship emissions from her footprint, 
then her footprint can no longer guide her to the full range of possible emissions 
reductions that she has reason to make.
Now consider subsistence emissions. As avoiding these emissions is not a real-
istic option for Chantelle, it may seem unproblematic to exclude these emissions 
from her carbon footprint. But this impression is mistaken: Suppose that Chan-
telle needs to emit 2 t of  CO2 a year for using her car for local transport, since 
there is no other way for her to get to work and buy groceries. Individually, she 
cannot avoid these emissions without forgoing a minimally decent life, but this 
does not mean that she is off the hook: The social structures which make such 
high transport emissions necessary can, and should, be changed through collec-
tive action. Chantelle can advocate for such collective action through exercising 
her vote, writing to her political representatives, and otherwise participating in 
the public debate. For this reason, it is important that Chantelle can see the una-
voidable 2t of transport emissions in her footprint, as this shows her that there is a 
need for social change and engagement. By excluding subsistence emissions from 
her carbon footprint, the concept of carbon footprint fails to fully fulfil this guid-
ance function.
Moreover, treating subsistence (and hardship) emissions differently from lux-
ury emissions also has absurd implications for climate-friendly social change. 
Suppose that Chantelle’s society can invest heavily in public transport. A common 
way to advocate for such change is to point out that it would help reduce the car-
bon footprint of people in Chantelle’s society, as they are then less likely to drive. 
Yet, this reasoning would not apply if we assume a Footprint Thesis* according 
to which only subsistence emissions are included in people’s footprints. This is 
because if the investment goes through, then the emissions from any remaining 
car journeys that Chantelle makes, say for mere convenience, would no longer 
qualify as subsistence, but instead as luxury emissions, and would now increase 
her footprint. The best that Chantelle can hope for from the investment in public 
transport is then to keep her footprint constant, namely, if she foregoes driving 
entirely. Investment in public transport would hence not reduce her footprint, and 
this means that concern for her footprint cannot motivate this climate-friendly 
social change.
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3.3  More Moderate Splits: Procreation is Not that Significant
More moderate specifications of the Footprint Thesis* can also not be attractive 
for anyone who aims to show that procreation is a nearly all-important contributing 
factor to parents’ carbon footprint, and that procreative choices are hence of over-
whelming importance from a climate ethics perspective. This is because more mod-
erate specifications of the Footprint Thesis* fall far short of yielding the staggering 
numbers presented by Murtaugh and Schlax.
Take MacIver’s (2015: 115f.) minimal proposal, namely that only subsistence 
emissions count towards parents’ footprints. Most importantly, these emissions do 
not include emissions of subsequent generations, as having a child, important as it 
may be for many people, is not necessary for living a minimally decent life. This 
restriction blocks the main driver of Murtaugh and Schlax’ calculations, namely the 
accumulation of emissions over many generations.
To estimate how much a child’s subsistence emissions would increase her parents’ 
footprint, we have consulted several carbon footprint calculators and selected the 
lowest-carbon options offered in all choices. According to the calculators that offer 
the most radical emissions-reducing options, someone who always chooses the low-
est-emissions option will produce 1.4t of emissions annually. We here assume that 
the corresponding maximally-carbon-frugal lifestyle is the subsistence minimum.18 
On top of this number, one may want to include base emissions for the upkeep of 
public infrastructure and services. For example, for the UK, the WWF estimates that 
these emissions amount to 3t per year per person. Since infrastructure and services 
would be provided and maintained irrespective of whether a specific person exists or 
uses them, it is not obvious that they need to be included in a person’s footprint.19 So 
let us assume a range of 1.4t–4.4t per year for subsistence emissions.
Now, assume that Chantelle will live for 80 years. She then produces 108-
352t of subsistence emissions, which increases Abel and Berenice’s footprints by 
54t-176t each. This footprint increase is one to two orders of magnitude smaller than 
the numbers provided by Murtaugh and Schlax (2009: 18), and having one child 
less consequently ranks comfortably alongside relatively non-disruptive meas-
ures such as increasing the fuel efficiency of one’s car by 50%, which saves some 
148t (Murtaugh and Schlax 2009: 18). This moderate specification of the Footprint 
Thesis* thus fails to capture the supposedly overwhelming significance of procrea-
tive choices. We thus have to reject claims such as MacIver’s contention that “[h]
owever we divide up responsibility for impacts, […] procreative decisions are by far 
18 See, for instance, https ://www.carbo nfoot print .com/, http://footp rint.wwf.org.uk/, https ://coolc limat 
e.berke ley.edu/calcu lator . None of the calculators offer the option of going completely “off the grid” and 
living as a subsistence farmer or a hunter-gatherer in the forest, so we here still have a relatively generous 
notion of subsistence emissions.
19 They could be included as expected emissions, under the assumption that there is a tiny probability 
that one more person will lead to more provisions of public infrastructure and services. Under plausi-
ble assumptions, each person’s expected emissions are her equal share in the overall base emissions. Cf. 
Kagan (2011: 15–27) and Singer (1980: 335–336) for more detailed discussion of structurally similar 
cases.
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the most ecologically significant decisions that individuals will make in their lives” 
(MacIver 2015: 117, emphasis ours).20
3.4  Differentiating by Increasing Autonomy of Descendants
That more moderate specifications of the Footprint Thesis* turn out not to yield 
huge numbers also applies to another initially promising way of splitting emissions 
between parents and children, namely, to increasingly count children’s consumption 
emissions towards their own footprints as their autonomy develops.
Philippe van Basshuysen (2018a) offers the most recent example of such an 
“Autonomy Footprint Thesis*” (also considered in van Basshuysen 2018b). On his 
thesis, coming of legal age is the cut-off point before which all of the child’s emis-
sions count towards her parents’ footprints, and none towards her own, and after 
which all emissions count towards her own footprint and none towards her par-
ents’.21 Van Basshuysen arrives at an estimate of 45 tons of  CO2 per parent, which 
is significantly lower than the amounts suggested by the advocates of the Footprint 
Thesis we have discussed so far (up to 9441 tons). It is even an order of magni-
tude lower than Murtaugh and Schlax’ (2009: 18) “optimistic scenario” calculation 
of 562t, and is only about one-third of Murtaugh and Schlax’ estimate of the foot-
print savings incurred by doubling the fuel efficiency of one’s car. Hence, in van 
Basshuysen’s picture, procreation does not emerge as a supremely important con-
tributor to parents’ footprints.22
The main reason for these relatively low numbers is that on the Autonomy Foot-
print Thesis*, the emissions caused by any grandchildren that a child has after hav-
ing attained autonomy do not count at all towards her parents’ footprints, as these 
emissions fall squarely into the responsibility of the then-autonomous child (van 
Basshuysen 2018b: 2). Yet, it is the emissions caused by subsequent generations 
that lead to the supposedly impressive increases in parents’ footprints. Hence, if we 
divide emissions according to the child’s autonomy, as long as parents make sure 
that their offspring do not procreate before they can autonomously make procrea-
tive choices, having a child is not one of the most significant contributors to parents’ 
footprints.
Moreover, van Basshuysen’s estimate is still too high, as the Autonomy Foot-
print Thesis* is prone to over-estimate the difference that having a child makes 
to parents’ footprints.23 This is because this thesis would simply add the child’s 
20 MacIver is mistaken to make this claim in the context of talking about carbon footprint. It may well be 
true in another sense, namely that of carbon impact (see Sect. 5).
21 Broome (2016: 163) also advocates a split according to autonomy. See Cripps (2016: 122) for critical 
discussion.
22 Van Basshuysen and Brandsted (2018b: 2) point this out as well.
23 Note that by using legal age as a single cut-off point, van Basshuysen further overestimates the sup-
posed footprint of procreation, as he wrongly attributes to the parents the emissions the child autono-
mously causes before coming of legal age. For example, a teenager may cause emissions by eating meat 
when vegetarian options would be available. These emissions are autonomously caused, as teenagers are 
usually capable of making ethically informed decisions about their diet.
1 3
Procreation, Footprint and Responsibility for Climate Change 
non-autonomous consumption to her parents’ footprints. This way of calculating 
footprints thus assumes that when having a child, the parents’ own consumption 
remains unchanged. However, this assumption is mistaken: As many parents can 
attest, having a child makes a huge difference to their personal consumption. In con-
trast to emissions caused by the grown-up, financially independent child, the goods 
and services that cause childrearing emissions are financed by the parents. While 
the parents might receive financial support, e.g. in the form of tax credits, having a 
child typically comes at a significant net cost, and parents thus have to cut back on 
their personal consumption. Moreover, even very well-off parents for whom money 
is not an issue still have to adapt their lifestyles and consumption to some extent. 
For example, taking long-distance flights to go on a scuba diving vacation with a 
one-year-old is just not an option. By having a child, the parents therefore typically 
replace some of their personal consumption with childrearing expenses, which can 
reduce the net contribution that having a child makes to parents’ footprints.24
Van Basshuysen applies the Autonomy Footprint Thesis* without factoring in 
such consumption replacement. He simply assumes that an infant causes additional 
emissions of about half the per capita emissions of her society. His calculations thus 
over-estimate the contribution of childrearing to parents’ footprints, as if the parents 
had an additional half per-capita income to spend on the family’s consumption.
The Autonomy Footprint Thesis* thus cannot capture the idea that having a child 
is supposedly of massive climate ethical significance. Moreover, if childrearing 
expenses replace particularly high-emission consumption, such as overseas vaca-
tions, then on the Autonomy Footprint Thesis*, having a child might even decrease 
parents’ footprints—certainly not a conclusion that authors who subscribe to the 
Footprint Thesis would like to broadcast.25
3.5  Splitting Between Generations of Ancestors
On top of the splitting problem as discussed above, we should bear in mind that in 
order to avoid double-counting in the long-term, it is not enough to split emissions 
between descendants and their present-day ancestors. Instead, we must also refrain 
from counting the same descendants’ emissions towards their present-day and inter-
mediate ancestors. This need to avoid double-counting between generations leads to 
a further challenge for the Footprint Thesis.
Consider three generations, G1, G2, and G3. Murtaugh and Schlax count all of 
G3′s emissions towards G1’s footprints. But once we avoid double-counting, the 
resulting Maximum Footprint Thesis* doesn’t leave any of these emissions to be 
counted towards the footprint of G2. G2’s procreative choices, contrary to G1’s, 
24 However, there is at least some evidence that parents’ footprints might actually be higher than those of 
non-parents, because parents tend to prefer more convenient and time-saving but more carbon intensive 
options. See Nordström et al. (2020) comparison of the consumption-footprints of Swedish parents and 
non-parents.
25 We lack the data to estimate the extent of the consumption replacement effect, which anyhow might 
differ drastically depending on parents’ budgets and prior consumption patterns.
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then do not affect their own footprints at all. The thesis then fails to capture the ethi-
cal significance of G2’s procreative choices, and implausibly treats G1’s and G2’s 
similar procreative choices radically differently.
Those who want to hold onto the Footprint Thesis thus need to split emissions 
across generations of ancestors in a way that avoids double-counting and that treats 
like choices alike. These desiderata can easily be met by simply not counting emis-
sions across more than two generations at all, e.g. if we only count children’s non-
autonomous or subsistence emissions towards parents’ footprints. But, as we have 
seen, this comes at the cost of not yielding impressively high numbers for parents’ 
carbon footprint. Such revised versions of the Footprint Thesis fail to establish 
that procreative decisions matter significantly more than all other climate-relevant 
decisions.
We have yet to see a specification of the Footprint Thesis* that counts emissions 
across several generations and fulfils the above desiderata. But even if the challenge 
of developing such a thesis is met, once we split emissions across generations, the 
resulting Footprint Thesis* will fail to reflect that by not having children, every gen-
eration can avoid all of subsequent descendant’s emissions. It will thus fail to do 
what advocates of the Footprint Thesis typically are after, namely, highlighting the 
full significance of each generation’s procreative choices.
3.6  The Splitting Problem Summarized
The standard concept of carbon footprint requires that we do not double-count emis-
sions between individuals. Those wanting to hold onto the Footprint Thesis then 
need to adopt a specification of the Footprint Thesis* which avoids double-counting 
by splitting emissions between present-day ancestors, their descendants, and inter-
mediate generations of ancestors. But all such specifications have implausible impli-
cations or fail to highlight the supposed enormous significance that our procreative 
choices have for the climate. This is no accident, but the result of two trade-offs that 
are built into the need to avoid double-counting: The more of a future person’s con-
sumption emissions we count towards her ancestors’ footprints, the less this person’s 
footprint reflects the climate significance of her own consumption choices. Like-
wise, the more of these emissions we count towards the footprints of present-day 
ancestors, the less do the footprints of intermediate generations reflect the signifi-
cance of their procreative choices.
Any attempt to capture the supposed climate significance of procreation by 
means of the concept of carbon footprint is therefore fundamentally flawed. In the 
next section, we will review and reject the most explicit arguments brought forward 
in behalf of the Footprint Thesis. This discussion will enable us to diagnose more 
precisely what is wrong with the Footprint Thesis, and to point towards a better way 
of thinking about procreation and climate change.
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4  The Alleged Analogy Between Consumption and Procreation
Whereas many authors, such as Rieder and Hedberg, assume implicitly that we can 
think about procreation along the lines of consumption, Young (2001) and MacIver 
(2015) offer two explicit arguments for this claim. According to their arguments, 
there is no relevant moral difference between procreation and consumption (Young), 
or procreation is a form of appropriating resources in the same way as consump-
tion is (MacIver). The most straightforward way to establish these claims is to argue 
that there is a strong analogy between consumption and procreation, such that we 
can treat them similarly for the purposes of climate ethics. This is, prima facie, a 
promising strategy, since it is already widely accepted that excessive consumption, 
or what Young (2001: 183) calls “eco-gluttony”, can and should be criticised. If it 
can be established that procreation is sufficiently analogous to eco-gluttony to war-
rant the same negative appraisal, then it is plausible that procreation is, under cur-
rent conditions, criticisable in many cases. In the following, we scrutinize and reject 
both authors’ arguments for this analogy.
4.1  Young: Consumption, Procreation, and Foreseeable Impact
Young (2001: 183) argues that both consumption and procreation “are voluntary, 
arise from the same desires, and produce similar foreseeable, unintended environ-
mental impacts”. With regard to climate ethical considerations, both activities are on 
a par: They both contribute to a person’s carbon footprint, with the important differ-
ence that procreation contributes much more.
However, Young’s argument overgenerates: Applied across the board, the three 
conditions, foreseeability, voluntariness and similar motivation, imply that certain 
actions are analogous to consumption even though they have nothing to do with a 
person’s carbon footprint. Consider the following case:
Roxanne is a brilliant ER surgeon who leads a low-consumption lifestyle. Over 
the course of her career, she saves many lives that would be lost without her 
well-above-average medical expertise.26
All three criteria that Young gives for the supposed parity of consumption and 
procreation also apply to Roxanne: If Roxanne has a young patient on her operat-
ing table who would die if it were not for her skilled intervention, it is foreseeable 
that this patient, if he lives, will cause emissions for many years and his emissions 
would not occur if he had died. There is also a good chance that the patient will have 
descendants, who will also cause emissions that would not otherwise have occurred. 
Roxanne also acts voluntarily, as she has the option of not saving him. Lastly, Rox-
anne might act for motives similar to those that lie behind consumption. After all, 
in order to establish the supposed analogy between procreation and consumption, 
26 Roxanne might also save many people whom every competent surgeon could have saved. What mat-
ters for our purpose is that she saved people who would have died if it weren’t specifically for her inter-
vention.
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Young must adopt a very broad conception of these motives: “the motives behind 
reproduction and overconsumption are often identical: cultural expectations, 
improved status, elevated self-esteem, increased happiness, or an altruistic desire 
to share with others” (ibid. 185). We do not need to discuss here whether Young’s 
claims about motivation are just an ad hoc manoeuvre to make consumption and 
procreation appear more similar. What matters for us is that Young’s stipulation 
also strengthens the analogy between consumption and Roxanne. Roxanne may save 
lives in order to conform to role expectations of her as a doctor, to gain social status 
or to elevate her self-esteem, her work may simply make her happy, or her work may 
be altruistically motivated.27
By Young’s reasoning, Roxanne’s actions are on a par with consumption deci-
sions, and these emissions are to be included in Roxanne’s footprint. Since Roxanne 
is very good at her job, by the time she retires, her footprint will be enormous and 
dwarf even extreme cases of overconsumption.
This is implausible. Roxanne’s footprint should not include her patients’ emis-
sions after she saved them. To make this point apparent, recall that Roxanne’s foot-
print measures how much atmospheric absorption capacity she uses up, and her 
footprint is supposed to help evaluate her behaviour and to guide her towards pos-
sible improvements. Implicit in all this is the claim that Roxanne is morally respon-
sible for the emissions included in her footprint. Moreover, due to the need to avoid 
double-counting, any given unit of emissions can be included only in one person’s 
footprint. By counting a given emission towards Roxanne’s rather than someone 
else’s footprint, we thus say that she uses up the respective absorption capacity of 
the atmosphere, and that she in particular has to answer for, justify, and potentially 
reduce these emissions.
Now suppose that Roxanne saves a patient who, to celebrate his recovery, takes a 
long-distance vacation flight, and that this was foreseeable for Roxanne. By Young’s 
reasoning, these emissions have to be counted towards Roxanne’s footprint,28 i.e. 
Roxanne uses up the respective absorption capacity, and she in particular is respon-
sible for this. But this is implausible, because the emissions from the flight are pri-
marily the patient’s responsibility, and thus should count towards the patient’s, and 
not Roxanne’s, footprint.29
We anticipate two possible responses to our argument against Young’s analogy. 
First, Young might respond by pointing out that since Roxanne, in her role as a 
27 In Sect.  4.2 we argue that we should not consider motivations or intentions as a relevant factor in 
determining a person’s footprint.
28 By the same reasoning, the emissions might also have to be counted towards the patient’s footprint. 
Thus, Young’s argument would directly imply objectionable double-counting. Young could respond 
that the patient’s behaviour satisfies the three conditions that establish an analogy with consumption 
more fully than Roxanne’s act of saving the patient does, and that the emissions thus should count only 
towards the patient’s footprint. However, children’s consumption might satisfy these conditions more 
fully than their parents act of procreation does, and thus children’s emissions should count towards their 
own, and not their parents’ footprints. Hence, this response would undermine the very aim of Young’s 
argument.
29 Gheaus (2019: 9) briefly makes a similar point about the claim that parents are morally responsible for 
the emissions of their children.
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doctor, is morally obligated to do everything in her power to save her patient, she 
does not act voluntarily, strictly speaking. However, this response fails: Even though 
it would violate her role obligations if she did not help, it is still possible for her 
to decide not to help her patient, and she thus still acts voluntarily if she decides 
to help. Moreover, the claim that obligatory actions are not strictly voluntary has 
implausible implications for consumption that is necessary to fulfil our role obliga-
tions. For example, it would then turn out that flying to the deathbed of a faraway 
parent, or other carbon-intensive necessary means to discharge one’s role obliga-
tions, are not voluntary, and not part of one’s (or anyone’s) footprint.
Second, Young might want to reject our claim that Roxanne does not have an 
enormously large footprint. He could, for example, argue that what the Roxanne 
case shows is that Roxanne does have an enormous footprint, but that she can justify 
this footprint because she incurred it when engaging in morally good or socially 
valuable actions, or in fulfilment of her role obligations, for which we want to make 
footprint allowances.30
However, this position has unacceptable implications for the footprint of Rox-
anne’s patients: If Roxanne’s footprint included (some or all of) her patients’ 
future emissions, then, in order to avoid double-counting, these emissions can-
not also count towards her patients’ (or their parents’) footprints. This has bizarre 
implications: Suppose that some of the emissions added to Roxanne’s footprint are 
subtracted from her patients’ footprints. A great way for us to reduce our carbon 
footprint would then be to drive recklessly, get into a nasty car accident, and have 
ourselves saved by Roxanne. We would then have a zero, or at least lower, carbon 
footprint for the rest of our lives, without having to change our lifestyles at all! This 
absurd implication would follow because some or all of what we emit would hence-
forth count towards Roxanne’s footprint, since without her intervention these emis-
sions would not have occurred. Similar implications follow if the emissions added to 
Roxanne’s footprint are taken out of the footprints of her patients’ parents.
To sum up: Young’s argument for the Footprint Thesis overgenerates, as it 
implies that we should allocate a patient’s future emissions to the ER surgeon who 
saved her, which has implausible implications for the footprints of the surgeon and 
the patient.
4.2  MacIver: Procreation and Creating Claims on Resources
MacIver (2015: 110) conceives of the common element between consumption and 
procreation in terms of claims we make to limited resources and how these claims 
impact the interests of others. He claims that
30 In a footnote Rieder (Rieder 2016: 40, fn. 8) discusses the possibility of large but justified footprints: 
“Physicians who work for Doctors Without Borders presumably have a large carbon footprint as a result 
of their international travel; I would think that their relatively large contribution to climate change is jus-
tifiable in the way that flying from New York to Paris for a fancy lunch would not be”. Note that Rieder 
only considers the emissions caused by the doctors’ travels. He does not consider the most extensive cli-
mate impact of the physicians’ work, namely, saving lives, nor does he provide reasons for not including 
this impact in the doctors’ (justifiable) footprints.
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[I]nsofar as all people make claims to natural goods by virtue of existing, cre-
ating new people is functionally equivalent to creating new claims to natural 
goods (MacIver 2015: 113)
and
there is no morally relevant distinction between an individual claiming a large 
quantity of natural goods for her own personal use, and an individual claiming 
a large quantity of natural goods for the use of her offspring (ibid. 115).
To avoid counter-intuitive implications for Roxanne’s footprint, MacIver needs to 
argue that Roxanne’s actions do not lay claim to the resources that her patients will 
consume in the future. He could, for example, point out that it is indeed odd to say 
that Roxanne lays claim to the resources consumed by the people she saves—if she 
lays claim at all, she simply lays claim to the resources needed for medical proce-
dures, and the patients then keep laying claims to resources for their consumption.
But this response is too quick, because an analogous point could be made about 
parents: They lay claims to resources for rearing a child, but they do not claim the 
resources the grown-up child will consume—it is the grown-up child who claims the 
resources. Hence, on a narrow reading of “laying claims” that gives the right result 
for Roxanne, making a claim for oneself is also different from creating or sustaining 
someone who can and will lay claims, and MacIver’s argument does not fly. Alter-
natively, if we grant MacIver a wide conception of claiming resources, then it is dif-
ficult to see how it would not encompass both creating persons who lay claims and 
sustaining persons who lay claims. The analogy would then overgenerate.
In response, MacIver may argue that a doctor simply saves the patient and might 
not care whether the person, once she leaves the hospital, lives or dies, whereas par-
ents (presumably) want their children to live long and prosperously, knowing full 
well that doing so will cause emissions. On this picture, future consumption and 
procreation are closely connected in a way that does not hold for the doctor’s work.
However, we think this is not a decisive difference. After all, the Footprint Thesis 
is not about what we want to be the case or intend, but what emissions we in particu-
lar are responsible for. Suppose that I procreate, intending my child to only have a 
minimal impact on the climate, but this intention is frustrated as my child consumes 
as much as everyone else. I cannot excuse myself by saying that this is not what I 
intended, as long as it was foreseeable that an additional member of my society will 
emit roughly as much as everyone else. Likewise, MacIver cannot use intentions to 
differentiate between parents and Roxanne.
In addition, suppose, for the sake of argument, that intentions are relevant for the 
question of whether some emissions are included in one’s carbon footprint. If Rox-
anne cares deeply about the long-term well-being of her patients after the medical 
procedure, then she would have an enormous carbon footprint compared to a col-
league who couldn’t care less if patients dropped dead once they left the hospital. It 
would then seem that Roxanne, like caring parents, is claiming resources (on behalf 
of someone else) whereas her colleague (all else being equal) is not. Furthermore, 
once we exclude double-counting, a patient (or her parents) implausibly would have 
a lower post-operation footprint merely in virtue of being saved by Roxanne rather 
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than by Roxane’s indifferent colleague. Since these are absurd implications, we 
should reject the assumption that it matters what one intends the saved or newly 
created person to do. If there is no further difference in how doctors and parents 
lay claim to resources, then MacIver’s reasoning extends to cases like Roxanne, and 
thus overgenerates.
MacIver entertains another feature of procreation that might allow him to distin-
guish between procreation and saving lives. He points out that “new people have no 
interest in being brought into existence” (MacIver 2015: 114), and that
insofar as we have no role or interest in being brought into existence, at mini-
mum the unavoidable impacts and claims associated with our existence should 
be understood as belonging to our parents—at least for the purposes of assign-
ing responsibility or weighing entitlements (ibid. 116–7)
However, that “new people” have no interest in being brought into existence does 
not help MacIver’s argument for the Footprint Thesis.31 Even if we accept this dif-
ference between procreation and Roxanne’s work, MacIver’s position would still 
have implausible implications in a different case:
Ivy is a retired IVF doctor who helped couples conceive who cannot have chil-
dren without specialized medical intervention. Her help has been a necessary 
condition for thousands of conceptions and resulting births.
It follows from MacIver’s reasoning that Ivy has an enormous footprint since her 
work is analogous to procreation: Ivy’s work is a necessary contribution to bringing 
into existence claims of new people who have no prior interest in coming into the 
world, and thus Ivy’s footprint should include some of these people’s consumption 
emissions.
Just as in the case of Roxanne, this implication for Ivy’s footprint is implausi-
ble. The point here is not that Ivy does socially valuable or morally good things 
which justify an enormous footprint. Instead, the appropriate verdict is that, contra 
MacIver, she does not have such an enormous footprint to begin with. Furthermore, 
as in the Roxanne case, counter-intuitive implications for Ivy’s footprint are only 
one part of the problem: If we counted some or all of the emissions of an IVF-con-
ceived baby towards Ivy’s footprint, then, in order to avoid double-counting, these 
emissions cannot also be counted towards the baby’s or her parents’ footprints. It 
then bizarrely turns out that making oneself require IVF treatment for procreation 
is a great way to reduce one’s family’s footprint. Hence, even if MacIver can escape 
the overgeneration problem by differentiating Roxanne’s case from procreation, he 
faces the same problem again in the case of Ivy.
In summary, the available rationales for the Footprint Thesis have implausible 
implications for the personal carbon footprint of doctors like Roxanne and Ivy. Yet, 
31 Note also that, as we argued with regard to subsistence emissions in Sect. 3.2, according to the “mini-
mum” of counting only “unavoidable impacts”, procreation makes only a moderate contribution towards 
parents’ footprints. Thus, MacIver’s proposal fails to yield his desired conclusion, namely, that procrea-
tion is one of the most significant contributors to parents’ carbon footprints.
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without these rationales, it is no longer clear why we should affirm the Footprint 
Thesis at all. This holds all the more considering that the Footprint Thesis faces the 
double-counting and splitting problems.
5  Footprint and Impact
We have shown that including procreation in parents’ carbon footprints is bedevilled 
with problems, and the main arguments for doing so fail. Yet, we do concede that 
given the unsustainability of humankind’s carbon emissions, climate ethics must 
address actions that bring yet more high-emitters into existence. Our arguments do 
not deny this, but only show that the hitherto undertheorized role of procreation in 
climate ethics should not be conceptualized in terms of carbon footprint or in anal-
ogy to consumption.
In response to our arguments, those who want to hold onto the Footprint Thesis 
may be tempted to reconceptualize the notion of carbon footprint in a way that would 
allow them to include procreation into parents’ carbon footprint—for instance, by 
permitting double-counting. However, such a revised measure will cease to function 
as an easy-to-use, informative and already-established tool for individual decision 
making, personal lifestyle choices, social criticism, and policy making. We there-
fore suggest that those who want to highlight the significance of procreation drop 
the idea that procreation contributes to parents’ footprints. Instead, they should avail 
themselves of a different concept: carbon impact.
While personal carbon footprint measures how much of the limited absorption 
capacity of the atmosphere a person uses up, carbon impact measures how much 
of a difference an activity makes to overall emissions. These two concepts overlap 
but can also come apart: Changing one’s footprint often makes a difference to over-
all emissions. For example, if I drive a car, more  CO2 is being emitted than would 
have been had I walked instead. But not all changes to one’s footprint have a carbon 
impact: If I buy the last vegan burger in a cafeteria and thus the vegan in line behind 
me has to buy the beef option, then overall meat consumption and the resulting 
emissions remain constant. This holds even though my footprint is now lower than it 
would have been had I bought the beef option. Conversely, and crucially for the pur-
poses of our argument, not all of your carbon impact features in your carbon foot-
print, as you can impact overall emissions in a multitude of ways that have nothing 
to do with you using up carbon absorption capacity. For example, you can convince 
others to consume more or less, vote for green or non-green parties, and save or fail 
to save someone’s life. None of these actions plausibly feature in your personal car-
bon footprint, as you don’t use up or preserve resources here. But these actions can 
make a big difference to overall emissions. We contend that procreation should be 
understood as part of parents’ carbon impact that does not feature in their footprints.
Understanding procreation in terms of such “pure” carbon impact is promis-
ing because contrary to the notion of footprint, the notion of impact does allow for 
double-counting. This is so because impact is concerned with the difference one’s 
actions make, not with the using up of resources. Two actions cannot use up the 
same resource twice, but both can be necessary conditions for a given emission to 
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occur. More generally, carbon impact represents causal responsibility, which allows 
for several conditions to be necessary causes of a given effect, and can thus easily 
allow for double-counting. For example, if two assassins together kill a person, each 
secretly administering one component of a poison, then both were necessary to kill 
the victim. We can then say that both of them committed a murder, i.e. made a dif-
ference which intentionally and wrongfully cost someone her life, without having to 
say that two persons were murdered. Likewise, our great-grandchildren’s emissions 
would not take place without their own actions as well as the procreative choices of 
their parents, their grandparents, and us. Carbon impact, as opposed to footprint, can 
capture this observation: We can count the entirety of our great-grandchildren’s con-
sumption emissions towards their own carbon impact and that of all of their ances-
tors, without mistakenly implying that these emissions happened multiple times.
Framing the significance of procreation in terms of carbon impact also avoids the 
problem of overgenerating that plagues the analogy between consumption and pro-
creation. This is because mere difference-making is not enough to establish the par-
ticular moral responsibility implied by carbon footprint. We can accept that Roxanne 
and Ivy have high carbon impacts, without accepting the implausible implication 
that they in particular are using up the respective absorption capacity, and that they 
in particular are morally responsible for these emissions.
In this way the concept of carbon impact allows climate ethicists to capture the 
idea that through our procreative choices we are able to make an enormous differ-
ence to overall emissions—more so than through many other choices, including con-
sumption choices. But note that, contrary to the supposed analogy to consumption, 
this position does not already establish that we have strong reasons to have fewer 
children. All we get at this point is that, insofar as overall lower carbon emissions 
are better for the climate, we have defeasible reasons to have fewer children. But 
these reasons need not be particularly strong, or they can be outweighed by other 
considerations or goods that an activity or choice would realize. For instance, Rox-
anne makes a large impact on the climate, but her actions are justified and morally 
unproblematic.32
However, those who share the intuition behind the Footprint Thesis need not be 
content with such a minimal moral conclusion. After all, while speaking in terms 
of carbon impact does not entail further normative evaluations, it also does not pre-
clude them, as the following example illustrates:
Honest Tony is a car salesman who specializes in selling cars to people who 
don’t have a car and don’t want one and would not buy one if it were not for 
Honest Tony’s persuasiveness. Since Honest Tony is skilled at his trade, he 
convinces many individuals that they need a car. It is foreseeable for Tony that 
this leads to higher overall emissions, but it is not Tony himself who emits. 
32 In contrast to Roxanne, Ivy’s behaviour may well be problematic, e.g. on grounds that helping parents 
conceive isn’t as morally weighty as saving the lives of already existing people. The framework of carbon 
impact allows detailed discussion of precisely such issues.
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Other people emit, but they would not have emitted had Tony not talked them 
into it.
We take it that for the sake of the climate (and other reasons) Tony ought not to 
be doing what he is doing, and that he (alongside his customers) is morally respon-
sible for the additional emissions caused. This holds even though he himself might 
have a very modest footprint, for instance because he is a vegan who commutes to 
work by bike and is mortally afraid of air travel. Yet, Honest Tony has a high and 
morally problematic carbon impact.
Hence if authors switch to talking about carbon impact instead of carbon foot-
print in order to address the climate ethics of procreation, then they face the follow-
ing challenge: Contrary to the concept of carbon footprint, the concept of carbon 
impact is morally much thinner. If their modified claims are to reveal strong climate-
related reasons against having children, then they have to provide convincing rea-
sons for evaluating the carbon impact of having children similarly to that of Honest 
Tony’s actions. If they wanted to make this case, then they have more work to do: 
they have to argue that, under current circumstances, having children (or more chil-
dren than one or two) is similar to the behaviour of Honest Tony, or other actions 
with high and objectionable impact (e.g. promoting climate change scepticism), and 
is relevantly dissimilar from cases like Roxanne, whose actions have a high but jus-
tifiable carbon impact.
Our arguments against the supposed analogies between procreation and consump-
tion show that there is no quick and easy way to establish that procreation (or pro-
creation beyond one or two children) is morally objectionable because it is suppos-
edly akin to consumption and blameworthy eco-gluttony. The answer to the question 
of whether and how much procreation is justifiable from a climate ethics perspec-
tive must be settled by a more nuanced debate, e.g. by asking which other cases of 
carbon impact procreation is analogous to (if any), and how we should judge these 
cases, or by developing different arguments that do not rely on such analogies to 
begin with. For example, towards the end of his book, Rieder (2016: 57–59) sug-
gests that the same green virtues should inform both our consumption behaviour and 
our procreative choices, without necessarily considering these two areas of differ-
ence making to be analogous or equivalent. Note that he does not, however, discuss 
the differences and similarities between these two (and other) areas of difference 
making that might influence how green virtues are to be respectively exercised in 
these areas. This is not a debate that we can pursue here. What we hope to have 
established is that the concept of carbon footprint and the analogy between procrea-
tion and consumption is unsuitable for debating the climate ethics of procreation, 
and the debate can be more fruitfully conducted in terms of carbon impact.
One caveat should be noted here: The above examples of carbon footprint without 
carbon impact, and carbon impact without carbon footprint might suggest that indi-
vidual climate ethics in general should focus exclusively on carbon impact. How-
ever, such a proposal would be premature: First, not all carbon impacts are impacts 
for which agents are morally responsible—Roxanne is a case in point. A climate 
ethics focused on impact has to differentiate between impacts for which agents are 
morally responsible, and those for which they are not. Among those impacts for 
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which agents are clearly morally responsible are those impacts which are also part of 
agents’ footprints, e.g. impacts arising from many cases of consumption. Thus, even 
in a climate ethics centered around the concept of impact, footprint would still play a 
prominent role. Second, even those parts of our carbon footprints that do not have an 
impact, as in the vegan burger case, are still morally relevant. It may be pointless for 
an agent to individually reduce these parts of her overall carbon impact, but having 
them included shows her the full amount of emissions associated with her activi-
ties, and can prompt her to support social change. In the vegan burger example, the 
agents could demand that more vegan options be provided.
6  Consumption and Childlessness
Let us return to the dilemma that we presented at the outset of this paper. Imagine 
the following case: Two friends travel to a reunion in a faraway place, one of them 
by train, and the other by plane. The first person, a frequent vacation flyer, contends 
that her lifestyle is no worse than that of the second, more ecologically minded, per-
son. This is because contrary to him, she doesn’t have children nor intends to ever 
have children.
Implicit in this defence of frequent vacation flights is the plausible assumption 
that it is permissible for anyone to have one or perhaps two children. That this is the 
case is widely accepted even by those who think that there are moral limits to pro-
creation. For instance, Travis Rieder and Sarah Conly33 admit that interests in having 
children are often of a fundamental nature and can ground rights to have a child.34If 
even more drastic population reductions than one-child families are required, then 
it may be required to multi-parent with more than two adults rearing a child (see 
Gheaus 2019). But given the common estimates for the supposed footprint of having 
a child, even with a ratio of e.g. six parents per child, the footprint allowance for par-
enting would still be very high, and we would hence still have to grant non-parents 
moral permission to engage in substantial additional, unsustainable consumption.
Those advocating or implicitly accepting the Footprint Thesis certainly do not 
aim to give anyone a pass on extensive consumption. Yet if we count procreation 
towards parents’ footprints, then we have to hold that the train-travelling friend 
is permitted to have a carbon footprint large enough to contain the emissions that 
follow from having one (or maybe two) children. As we have seen above, on any 
specification of the Footprint Thesis that makes procreation a highly significant con-
tributor to parents’ footprints, such a footprint would have to be quite large. The 
frequent flier without a child (and anyone with fewer than the permissible number 
of children) can then consume very extensively without exceeding her permissible 
33 Conly thinks that the contribution of overpopulation to environmental degradation justifies limiting 
procreation. Moreover, she assumes that reducing procreation via government regulations is more realis-
tic than reducing consumption on a large scale (see especially Conly 2016: 17).
34 Yet, for both of them there is a threshold—after the first child in the case of Conly (2016: ch.2) and 
after the first or second child in the case of Rieder (2016: 59)—after which having another child ceases to 
be a fundamental interest.
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carbon footprint. She simply “spends” her permissible footprint allowance on vaca-
tion flights as opposed to procreation.
The Footprint Thesis can only avoid this implication by adopting an implausibly 
harsh position on procreation, namely that it is not permissible to have even one 
child—this is the second horn of the dilemma.
To avoid the dilemma, parents could be granted a larger permissible footprint 
than non-parents. However, this response requires highly contentious assumptions 
about the value of different conceptions of the good life. It also opens the possibil-
ity for a slippery slope: If we tailor permissible footprints to people’s lifestyles or 
desires, then we could also grant a larger footprint allowance to people who long to 
travel just as much as other people long to have children. Furthermore, even if we 
tailored permissible footprints to people’s preferences, so that people who would 
only procreate for “frivolous” reasons are not morally permitted to procreate (as 
advocated by Hedberg 2019: 18), this would still leave involuntarily childless people 
who strongly desire to have children with an enormous footprint allowance that they 
would be permitted to spend on consumption.35
By contrast, our proposal to evaluate procreation in terms of impact instead of 
footprint allows us to straightforwardly sidestep the dilemma. Since, in our picture, 
procreation does not increase parents’ carbon footprint, we can hold that it is per-
missible to have one or two children without saying anything about permissible car-
bon footprints at all. Hence, we can then still hold that extensive consumption by 
people without children is impermissible. On this picture, whatever else one may 
want to say about the climate ethics of procreation, we are responsible for reducing 
our consumption emissions, irrespective of how many children we have. This is how 
it should be.
7  Conclusion
The idea that the emissions of one’s children count towards one’s personal carbon 
footprint has become very popular in climate ethics and popular discourse. Follow-
ing the most prominent calculations, the idea is held to imply that having children 
is a highly significant contributor to parents’ footprints, to the point of dwarfing the 
contribution of typical consumption choices.
Yet, as we have argued, this Footprint Thesis is wrought with serious problems: 
On the most common formulation, it implies hitherto largely unrecognised but 
highly objectionable double-counting of emissions towards parents’ and children’s 
footprints. If we avoid this problem by splitting children’s emissions between chil-
dren and parents, the Footprint Thesis has implausible implications for children’s 
footprints, and also often does not yield the implication that having children is a 
highly significant contributor to parents’ footprints. Moreover, we have argued that 
the arguments advanced on behalf of the Footprint Thesis, which aim to establish 
35 See also Gheaus (2019: 9, 15f.) for arguments against such tailoring of permissible footprints to peo-
ple’s motivations for parenting.
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an analogy between procreation and consumption, have implausible implications in 
other cases, such as doctors saving lives or helping couples conceive children.
We conclude that we should reject the Footprint Thesis, and think about the cli-
mate ethics of procreation by means of a different concept: carbon impact. Carbon 
impact allows for double-counting, and does not imply an analogy and possible 
trade-off between procreation and consumption.
What do our arguments imply for the authors who endorse the Footprint The-
sis? Evaluating the prospects for each individual position is well beyond the scope 
of this paper, so we here only give two initial conjectures: First, Rieder endorses 
the Footprint Thesis primarily in order to highlight the climate-related significance 
of procreation. Similar work can be done by pointing to the high carbon impact of 
procreation: It shows that there is something of potential moral significance here, 
even though it does not in itself show that there is something morally problematic. 
To support his normative and moral claims about procreation, Rieder then primar-
ily uses a separate conceptual apparatus, involving agent-neutral and agent-relative 
moral reasons, justice considerations and green virtues. Rieder can thus accommo-
date our criticism of the Footprint Thesis by switching from footprint to impact. 
He would have to make clear that it is his specific moral considerations, not the 
extent of the carbon impact of procreation as such, that supports his normative con-
clusions. Furthermore, he loses some of the initial plausibility of his conclusions, 
which were supported by the Footprint Thesis. So, his specific moral considerations 
would not have the independent support of the Footprint Thesis, and have to suffice 
entirely on their own.
Second, in contrast to Rieder, Young and MacIver, as well as Hedberg, derive 
normative conclusions directly from their endorsement of the Footprint Thesis. 
They hence cannot simply change their conceptual framework and talk about carbon 
impact instead, because carbon impact does not have the normative content to yield 
their conclusions. They hence have to do additional work to investigate why the high 
carbon impact of procreation supposedly makes it morally problematic.
More generally, on the proposed framework of carbon impact, observing that 
procreation has a very high carbon impact does not itself imply anything about the 
permissibility of procreation. Our arguments thus map out the direction that future 
research in the climate ethics of procreation should take: an investigation into per-
missible and impermissible carbon impacts.
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